Taqlid Versus Tajdid: A Malaysian Mufti on the Metholology of Islamic Reform

By Yoginder Sikand

Mohammad Asri Zainul Abidin (b.1971) is the present government-appointed mufti of the Malaysian state of Perlis. A prolific writer and a sharp political commentator, many of his writings are hosted on his website http://drmaza.com.[1]

Although Zainul Abidin writes on a wide range of issues, this article looks only at his discussion of the concept of taqlid or strict adherence to traditional fiqh, and the notion of tajdid or restoration and revival of what are regarded as authentic Islamic teachings. Engaging with these two doctrines, he articulates a methodology for developing more contextually-relevant perspectives on Islamic jurisprudence and theology.

The actual scope of the shariah in terms of enforceable law in Malaysia is strictly limited, mainly to family matters and to some crimes involving Muslims. In such matters, official muftis are supposed to issue opinions or fatwas in accordance with the established prescriptions of the Shafi’ school, which is the school of jurisprudence followed by most Malaysian Muslims. In other words, they are generally expected to abide by taqlid of the Shafi’ school. Yet, despite being the official Mufti of a Malaysian state, Zainul Abidin makes clear his uneasiness with the doctrine of rigid taqlid, presenting the concept of tajdid or renewal of the faith in its stead. In this way, he argues for reintroducing what he regards as the lost dynamism of Islamic jurisprudence in order to be able to suitably address new and rapidly social contexts and conditions. He may well be unique among the muftis of Malaysia in this regard, all of who are state-appointed. This is one reason why he is often quoted with approval by numerous ‘progressive’ Malaysian Muslim writers and activists.

Critique of Taqlid


In a short essay, provocatively titled Abide by Evidences and Facts, Abandon Blind Taqlid[2], Zainul Abidin summarises his approach on the doctrine of taqlid, so stoutly defended by the traditional ulema. His central argument is that the ‘supreme sources’ of Islam being the Quran and the authentic Sunnah, any claim that goes against these two sources, including anything in the received fiqh tradition, must not be accepted. At the same time, he suggests, the primary sources of Islam do not speak for themselves. Rather, they need to be interpreted. For this task, a major tool is the use of reason. This is because, as he puts it, ‘Islam is a religion that is build (sic.) on reasoning and evidences. There is no Islam without reasoning and evidences […] [I]t is impossible to find in the teachings of Islam anything that is in contrast to literal evidences and academic facts.’

In this regard, he indicates that certain aspects of the corpus of fiqh and certain claims of those who regard themselves as Islamic authorities that do not stand to reason cannot be considered authentically Islamic. Thus, he writes:

Whatever opinion that is produced in the name of Islam but does not revolve around the axis of reasoning and evidences from al-Quran and al-Sunnah is not from the teachings of Islam. [This is] [r]egardless [of] whether the one who generates that opinion attaches to himself various […] religious title[s] or wears various types of attire that are correlated to being religious.

Since reason and science are co-related, and since they are in consonance with Islam, Zaindul Abidin goes on, if any ‘view’ that is ‘associated with Islam’—by which he means human understandings of Islam—contradicts the ‘world’s order or conclusively proven scientific facts’ it should be considered ‘absolutely not from the teachings of Islam’. Likewise, he adds, if any view that is popularly accepted as ‘Islamic’ ‘degrades the well-being of humankind in a conspicuous way’, then, too it is ‘absolutely not from the teachings of Islam’.

Zainul Abidin here makes a crucial distinction between Islam, as Divine and Absolute Truth, on the one hand, and human interpretations of it—which he terms as ‘views’ that are ‘associated with Islam’—on the other. The former are eternal verities, and are in perfect harmony with reason, the confirmed facts of science and human well-being.[3] The latter, which also includes the corpus of fiqh, being , at least in part, human constructs, are liable to err, and, if they are found to do so by contradicting the Quran, the Sunnah, reason, the confirmed facts of science or human well-being, as defined by the Quran and Sunnah, Zainul Abidin argues that they must be rejected as ‘un-Islamic’, even if those who defend them might consider themselves to be Islamic religious authorities, such as muftis and other ulema.

This applies even to the opinions of the putative founders of the various established schools of fiqh.[4] He cautions his readers that this is not a novel opinion of his own invention. Rather, well-known classical Muslim scholars, including noted fuqaha, ironically even the putative founding Imams of the established schools of fiqh—blind conformity to whose views the traditional ulema continue to insist on—were of exactly the same opinion.[5]

By critiquing the notion of blind taqlid on solid Quranic grounds, and proving it to be even against the doctrines of the Imams whose rigid taqlid the traditionalists ironically continue to insist on, Zainul Abidin questions the widespread belief in the traditional ulema who enjoin strict taqlid of the established schools of fiqh as ultimate religious authorities.[6] As he puts it, backing his argument with a verse from the Quran:

The opinion of any individual–even a grand Islamic scholar–is entitled to be questioned so long as it does not concur to (sic.) the evidences provided by al-Quran and al-Sunnah. There is no one who is maksum [infallible], other than the messengers sent by Allah. For every religious opinion brought up by a certain personality or an ustaz [Islamic scholar] does not necessarily have to be swallowed wholly.

While Muslims should be respectful of the ulema, Zainul Abidin writes, it does not mean that they cannot present ‘intelligent criticisms’ or question their opinions on the basis of the Quran and Sunnah. The reason that he stresses this point, he explains, is to critique those many Muslims who dare not question, for fear of being branded as weak in faith, the opinion of men commonly regarded as Islamic scholars even though what the latter claim may be ‘utterly groundless’. Bitterly critiquing such clerics, he argues:

It seems like they have been granted with a colossal tongue to speak of anything in the name of our religion even without presenting any reasoning and strong evidence. Even worse, some of the religious teachers in the old days warned their students against asking questions saying that “Whoever asks a lot of questions, it shows that his faith is weak.”

Such obduracy, authoritarianism, and hostility to being questioned on the part of many of those who assume themselves to be Islamic authorities, Zainul Abidin points out, can have devastating practical implications, such as in the form of wrong, and what he terms ‘weird’, fatwas, some of which might find their way into the statute books and becoming legally binding. He refers to just two such fatwas issued in Malaysia in this regard, but says that there are ‘many other[s]’ of the same sort: a fatwa prohibiting Muslims from selling cows to non-Muslim Chinese; and another fatwa to the effect that if a particular sort of pickled fish (called Budu in Malay) were to touch one’s clothing it would be considered an impurity although eating it is permissible. Besides fatwas of this sort that he critiques, he cites other claims made by self-styled religious scholars who, he suggests, do not provide any sufficient proof from the Quran and Sunnah for their arguments, and which, therefore, are to be rejected.

Further stressing the need for even ‘ordinary’ or ‘lay’ to question those who claim to speak of and for Islam, Zainul Abidin insists that it is the right of the Muslim community as a whole, and of individual believers as well, to ask Islamic scholars and preachers for both the textual reference or nas in the Quran and Sunnah as well as their reasoning for any statements regarding Islam. This is because, he says:

An ustaz or a respected guru is not God’s appointed agent, unlike the Messengers of Allah, whose words, even if [in the event of ] lack of nas, must be agreed to […] [R]eligion is built on reasoning and evidences. If each one of us asks the ustaz for the cause and reasoning for every religious opinion given, then indirectly we would be fulfilling the principles of Islam and improve the intellectual level of our own group. Don’t let ourselves be content with just by memorizing religious opinions without re-thinking them in an analytical and rationale (sic.) way.

In this way, Zainul Abidin indicates, Muslims would be able to recover the inherent simplicity of Islam, which lies buried under man-made accretions over the centuries, a result, in part, of the influence of un-Islamic philosophies and what he calls ‘useless and cumbersome […] disputes without any direction and benefit’. It would help liberate the Islamic tradition from the morass of stagnation that is reflected in the insistence on mere memorization of texts while ignoring independent thinking and reflection. The latter, he explains, are sorely required to maintain the dynamism of Islamic thought and to practically prove Islam’s continued relevance in changing contexts. Further, he adds, it would accelerate the process of liberating the Muslim mind from ‘an obsessive devotion’ to a certain mazhab or school of fiqh. It would also democratize Islamic scholarship, and, hence, religious authority, liberating it from the monopolistic claims of those who claim to be experts in the field.[7]

Appeal for Tajdid

Related to Zainul Abidin’s forceful critique of taqlid is his passionate advocacy of tajdid or ‘renewal of the faith’. This is dealt with at length in an article titled
Tajdid: A Necessity To (sic.) the Ummah.[8] As he sees it, blind taqlid and tajdid are opposed to each other in several respects. While Islam frowns on blind taqlid, he stresses that tajdid is a constant necessity, mandated by Islam itself.

The concept of tajdid has been interpreted diversely by Islamic scholars. For some, it simply means cleansing Muslim society of what are seen as superstitious practices and beliefs that have no sanction in the Quran and the authenticated Sunnah. Some extreme literalists interpret tajdid as indicating an effort to mould Muslim society on exactly the same pattern as that of the times of the Prophet. In contrast, other scholars see tajdid as aiming to revive or restoring true Islamic beliefs and practices as well as reformulating Islamic thinking, or what Zaindul Abidin describes as ‘renewal of religious comprehension’, in order to maintain its continued relevance in the face of changing social contexts. In this latter case, it is closely related to the concept of ijtihad, which is precisely the opposite of blind taqlid. It is in this more expansive sense that Zainul Abidin uses the term tajdid and advocates its practice, which he sees as a religiously-mandated duty, and not simply an intellectually luxury that can be ignored. It is, as it has been throughout Muslim history, he says, instrumental in protecting the Muslim ummah from ‘becoming weak and impotent’.

According to general Muslim belief, derived from a Hadith report, the Prophet Muhammad is said to have predicted that at the end of every century God would raise a figure from within the Muslim ummah in order to restore Islam to its true form. This figure, the mujaddid, would engage in the necessary task of the tajdid of Islam. This does not, however mean, as some might construe it, that the tajdid of Islam is a task only for a single mujaddid to undertake in every century. To believe this to be the case would only encourage fatalism and laxity. Rather, the tajdid of Islam is something that Islamic scholars, and not just divinely-appointed mujaddids alone, must continuously and constantly seek to engage in.

As indicated above, tajdid, as Zainul Abidin sees it, is not limited only to cleansing Muslim society of wrong accretions in terms of belief and practice that have no sanction in the Quran and the authentic Hadith. Rather, in his more expansive understanding of the term, it also includes what he terms as ‘innovation[s] of certain element[s]’ that might be deemed necessary in order to ‘fulfill contemporary need[s] and requirement[s]’. He likens this to the innovation of the modern vehicle, which did not exist in the past but which is legitimate in that it serves a very basic human purpose of moving from one place to another. Such necessary ‘innovation’ demanded by changed social contexts, he suggests, is also part of the broader agenda of tajdid.

The necessary ‘innovation’ that Zainul Abidin advocates is completely different from bid‘ah, strictly translated also as ‘innovation’, which is considered by many literalists to be impermissible in Islam. The innovation in the course of tajdid that Zainul Abidin stresses should, he specifies, ‘be performed such that it does not change the religion’. He points out that tajdid and the innovations that it might entail are not a license for free-ranging changes. Instead, as what he calls ‘a suitable response to satisfy the new understanding or view brought about by the change in circumstances’, they must not deviate from ‘the essence and the requirement[s]’ of the Quran and the authenticated Sunnah. At the same time, he admits that such ‘innovation’ might, at times, clash with traditionally-held views that reflect the deep-rooted tradition of blind taqlid.

If tajdid is to be based on the Quran and the authenticated Sunnah, the question arises as to how these sources are to be interpreted. Just as he is critical of taqlid of the traditional ulema in matters of fiqh, Zainul Abidin also disagrees with those who argue that received interpretations of these two sources are to be blindly accepted. As for the Quran, he points out that while God has kept the text of the scripture completely free from error over the centuries, its interpretation, largely a human product, has been ‘contaminated’, owing, among other factors, to the influence of what are called Israiliyyat, stories and narrations of Jews and early Jewish converts to Islam, and other such ‘mythical stories’, which appear ‘funny and impractical’. Such distorted interpretations of the Quran, promoted by popular preachers, remain widespread, and combating them, he says, must be a major focus of those engaged in the work of tajdid.

Similar problems of authenticity relate to the existing corpus of Hadith—not just to their interpretation, but, also, unlike in the case of the Quran, to the content of a portion of that corpus. Zainul Abidin points out that throughout Muslim history, ‘thousands of fabricated hadith were created for the sake of various parties or due to lack of knowledge’. These fake Hadith reports, which also include what he calls ‘comical or garbled stories’, continue to be widely ‘quoted and narrated’, he rues. He insists that tajdid must be extended to the corpus of Hadith in the form of weeding out fabricated reports.

With regard to tajdid in relation to both the Quran and the authenticated Sunnah, Zainul Abidin seems to caution against excessive or unwarranted literalism. In what can be construed as an appeal for a contextual understanding of some aspects of these two sources—perhaps those with legal implications, although he does not specify this—he states, ‘Some of the nas from al-Quran and al-Sunnah has to be viewed in a much broader context in terms of its meaning and substance.’

Tajdid, in the sense of what Zaindul Abidin terms ‘renewal of religious comprehension’, extends not simply to critiquing and abandoning wrong interpretations of the Quran that are heavily influenced by Israiliyyat traditions and abandoning fabricated Hadith. It also extends to issues of fiqh, or what is commonly regarded as the shariah in practice. Tajdid with regard to this sphere, Zainul Abidin says, would necessarily entail abandoning what he calls ‘mazhab fanaticism’, that is to say the tendency to insist on taqlid of a particular school of jurisprudence even when its prescriptions might contradict the Quran and the authenticated Sunnah. Such an approach, besides being un-Islamic, he writes, necessarily leads to ‘narrow-mindedness’ and imposes considerable inconvenience and burden to Muslims themselves, something that the Prophet himself is said to have warned against in the following hadith report contained in the Sahih al-Bukhari which Zainul Abidin approvingly quotes:

Religion is very easy and whoever overburdens himself in his religion will not be able to continue in that way. So you should not be extremists, but try to be near to perfection and receive the good tidings that you will be rewarded.

It is not just traditional fiqh prescriptions that have no warrant in the Quran and the authenticated Sunnah that need to be revised in the process of the tajdid of Islam, Zainul Abidin appears to argue. In addition to this are some fiqh rulings and opinions of the classical ulema which may have been appropriate in their social and historical context but which, he writes, now ‘have expired due to the change in time and circumstances’. Tajdid should extend to these as well, and they should be replaced by more contextually-relevant opinions or formulations, which should also be in accordance with the Quran and the Sunnah.

In advocating tajdid and decrying taqlid, Zainul Abidin is not unmindful of the opposition that his views are bound to invoke from some quarters. As he puts it, the advocates of tajdid are often ‘criticized and subjected to […] slander’ by those who are ‘bothered by tajdid’. Yet, he insists, this is a task that must be carried out. He backs his appeal by invoking the Prophet as having said, ‘Indeed Islam began as something strange. And it will return as something strange the way it began. So give glad tidings to the strangers’. When asked who the ‘strangers were’, the Prophet was reported to have answered, ‘Those who are righteous when the people have become corrupt’.

[1] Zainul Abidin writes in Bahasa Malaysia, and only a relatively small proportion of his writings have been translated into English and are available on his website. Material for this chapter has been taken from the English section of his website.
[2] http://drmaza.com/english_section/?p=11

[3] In this regard, he approvingly quotes the renowned faqih Imam Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah as writing, ‘“Indeed the shariah of Islam, its construction and foundation are built on wisdom and goodness for humans in this world and hereafter. The shariah of Islam is all about justice, goodness and wisdom. Therefore, every aspect that departs from justice into vindictiveness, from blessing into its opposite, from goodness into badness, from wisdom into foolishness is not from the shariah of Islam even though it is interpreted as such.”

[4] Here he argues that even the writings of the Imams must be judged by using the Quran and Sunnah as standards, and only those views of theirs that are in conformity with these sources must be accepted.

[5] Here he quotes the noted Shafi’ scholar, Imam al-Muzani, as having written that Imam Shafi himself forbade anyone from engaging in blond taqlid of him.
[6] He refers here to Imam Shatibi as stressing, ‘Thus, it is compulsory for us to follow the one that was guarded from making mistakes [the Prophet] and to stop following whoever that is not being (sic.) shielded from mistakes whenever there seem to be doubts about it.

[7] ‘If this form of learning could be moulded’, Zainul Abidin opines, ‘then Islam would no longer be deemed as being exclusive such that only a few people are allowed to contemplate it and the rest must follow blindly’.
[8] http://drmaza.com/english_section/?p=87#more-87